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H usserl's Cartesian Meditations culminates with the fifth Medita-tion's extensive account of intersubjectivity and the transcenden-
tal community. Central to this account is the phenomenological expli-
cation of the experience of the other. The first four Meditations, by
contrast, focus on an examination of the ego cogito as transcendental
subjectivity and offer an explanation of the manner in which the ego
constitutes the field of transcendental experience-Ieading to the elu-
cidation of the ego cogito as transcendental idealism. The fifth Medi-
tation, then, while the summit ofHusserl's phenomenological investi-
gation, also emerges as a response to the most serious objection that
might be levied against that investigation, vize that phenomenology,
conceived as self-explication of the ego-of the subjectivity that is
constitutive ofbeing and sense-entails solipsism. Husserl, of course,
is aware of this objection; he himself draws attention to it in the
second Meditation. In the fifth Meditation, however, it emerges that
transcendental subjectivity is always already a transcendental inter-
subjectivity. Hence the presentation of this final piece to the phenom-
enological puzzle results in an apparent dialectical coup, for it pur-
portedly reveals that the solution to the problem of solipsism was
always right there, latent in the articulated structure of (inter)subjec-
tivity itself and thus that the problem was strictly methodological
and never had a foothold at the constitutionallevel.
In what foliows, I will examine and evaluate the fifth Medita-
tion-and this apparent "dialectical coup"-vis-a-vis the following
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questions: (a) Is Husserl's account of intersubjectivity consistent with
his earlier explication of transcendental idealism? (b) Does this ac-
count in fact dispel the spectre of solipsism? (c) Does Husserl provide
a suitably robust notion of the Other, one which challenges the
primacy of the ego and which can thereby underpin an account of the
genuine face-to-face ethical relationship? While (c) may be extrinsic
to Husserl's account, it is nonetheless the most crucial question we
can pose, and in answering it we will anticipate the views of thinkers
such as Levinas and Deleuze-thinkers influenced by Husserl pre-
cisely because they find a consideration of this question inescapable.
1. INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN HUSSERL'S FIFTH MEDITATION
The ostensible objective of the fifth Meditation is to provide a
response to the concern that transcendental phenomenology leads to
solipsism. Hence Husserl's introductory question: "When I, the medi-
tating I, reduce myself to my absolute transcendental ego by phe-
nomenological epoche do I not become solus ipse?" (Husserl, CM, 89).
The axial phenomenological operation of epoche would seem to leave
the meditating I bereft of all connection to the objective world, for it
requires the I to place in parenthesis all that is taken for granted by
common sense, viz. the acceptance of the objective world as real. This
is precisely the "universal depriving of acceptance" (Husserl, CM, 20)
that is required in order for the ego's cogitationes to emerge as pure
phenomena. This suspension of acceptance is the first step towards
the phenomenological attitude which makes possible the intentional
analysis of the structure of pure consciousness. Epoche paves the way
to the specification of the I as pure ego; the I thus acquires the pure
ego that the Cartesian ego cogito fails to reach.1 For this very reason,
however, the meditating ego is even further immersed in solipsism
than is the meditating ego at the end of Descartes' second Meditation.
The solipsism facing Husserl, then, is perhaps even more tenacious
than that facing Descartes.2
Husserl suggests that a consideration of other egos will allow the
problem ofsolipsism-and the problem of the objective world, which
is really just the same problem alternatively stated-to be navigated.
Transcendental idealism, after all, restricts the meditating ego to the
stream of its conscious processes and the constructions of those
processes. All apparent actualities in the "objective world," then, are
ultimately grounded in these intentional processes and belong to the
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ego. But other egos, Husserl suggests, "surely are not a mere intend-
ing and intended in me" (Husserl, CM, 89). Is it the case, however,
that other egos escape the purview of the I's phenomenological
sphere? This is precisely the question to which Husserl devotes him-
self in the initial sections of the fifth Meditation. "We must discover,"
he decides, "in what intentionalities, syntheses, motivations, the
sense 'other ego' becomes fashioned in me" (Husserl, CM, 90). The
suggestion is that the examination of the experience of the other ego
will somehow lead us to the route out of solipsism. 3
Husserl first attends to the way in which the external world is
experienced by me. The key point is that I experience the world "as
other than mine alone, as an intersubjective worId" (HusserI, CM, 91).
Put another way, we might say that, rather than experience a world,
we experience intersubjectivity. Others are simply "there for me" in
my commerce with the external world. We have here what, following
H. Peter Steeves, we might call a "social ontology," in which, at a
basic level, "the Ego and the Other are constituted together" (Steeves,
84). Insofar as the ego experiences a world-and is thereby consti-
tuted as a "self"-it experiences others.
Nonetheless, we cannot abandon the fundamental insight of tran-
scendental idealism. That is, we must maintain that any sense that
any existent thing (including other egos) can have for me "is a sense
in and arising from my intentionallife" (Husserl, CM, 91). At the very
least, the limits of this fundamental principle must be explored. For
this reason, Husserl effects a further reduction-the reduction of all
experience to my sphere of ownness. If intersubjectivity is in fact
basic, constitutive in some way, then it remains when everything else
is reduced away. Or, it drops out and the question then is: how is
intersubjectivity constituted?
The reduction to my sphere of ownness, then, is a particular sort
of epoche; the point is to delimit "the total nexus of that actual and
potential intentionality in which the ego constitutes within himself a
peculiar ownness" (Husserl, CM, 93). The constitutional effects of the
ego with respect to the "objective world" are bracketed and existent
things as "other" are excluded from our thematic field. In this man-
ner, we reach the core of radical ownness and what is peculiar to me
as pure ego, vize a monadic matrix of intentionalities. This monadic
structure is all that is left after the reduction to my sphere of ownness.
However, while the "objective world," the "Nature" of natural sci-
ence experienceable by everyone, no longer remains in this reduced
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stratum, the ego's intentionalities remain-intentionalities directed
towards what is other. We may screen offwhat is other, however the
"psychic life of my Ego ... including my actual and possible experi-
ence of what is other, is wholly unaffected" (Husserl, CM, 98). This
"possible experience" includes the possibility of other egos.
Having reached this original sphere, we are still unable to do
away with the possibility of the other ego. As Steeves puts it, "we are
unable to reduce experience completely so as not to have a notion of
Others" (Steeves, 83). Given that intersubjectivity remains even in the
primordial sphere of ownness, we must account for the process that
permits us access to the ego of the Other. That is, if the other ego is
not ours, if it is another sphere of ownness, how can it remain after
the reduction to our sphere of ownness? In order to address this
crucial question, Husserl appeals to the notion of appresentation.
The fact that my intentionality canbe directed towards something
that is excluded from my sphere of ownness makes it evident that the
other's essence can be only indirectly accessible to my consciousness.
For, as Husserl recognizes, "if what belongs to the other's own es-
sence were directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my
own essence" (Husserl, CM, 109). A certain mediacy must be present
in intentionality-a mediacy which makes present the "there-too" of
the other just as the subjective stream of my intentional processes in
my sphere of ownness makes present the "here." Hence there is a co-
presence of the "here" and the "there-too"; this making "co-present"
is what Husserl dubs "appresentation" (Husserl, CM, 109).
The other cannot be experienced by me as a result of a direct pre-
sentation-it can only manifest itself via appresentation. Appresenta-
tion is based on apperception, an analogizing transfer of an original
sense to a new instance (Husserl, CM, 111). This analogizing transfer,
however, does not involve an inference from analogy;4 rather, as we
intuitively grasp the sense "other," we transfer back to a similar sense
given beforehand in our sphere of ownness. The new case can only be
new insofar as it is given beforehand in an instituting primordial
sphere. The "transfer" thus involves the enriching of the instituting
already-given case through the apprehension of the new case. As
Husserl explains, the sense "other" "in further experience which
proves to be actually new may function in turn as institutive and
found a pregiveness that has a richer sense" (Husserl, CM, 111).
This "analogizing transfer" returns us to the idea that the other
ego is constituted simultaneously with my ego. For only if there is
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this simultaneous constitution can we speak of "the actually new
which can function as institutive." While the essence of the other ego
can never be an object of direct perception (but only apperception), it
remains the case that "ego and alter ego are always and necessarily
given in an original 'pairing'" (Husserl, CM, 112). "Pairing," then,
functions as the constitutive component of the experience of the
other. It first takes place when the other enters my perceptual field.
We thus are presented with two phenom.enological data-ego and
other ego-"data appearing with mutual distinctness [but which]
found phenomenologically a unity of similarity and thus are always
constituted precisely as a pair" (Husserl, CM, 112).
Pairing is a "passive synthesis" designated as association; this
association provides me with a sort of empathetic intuition into the
essence of the other.5 Again, our apprehension of the other cannot be
direct; it can only take place via the associative mechanism of pairing.
Pairing reveals that, as Kersten puts it, "there is an inward for me
which, however, is never of essential necessity mine but for me
always yours, and only yours in so far as it is for me" (Kersten, 252).
In other words, each ego apperceives the other in accordance with the
sense of the other; there is reciprocity of apperception.
It must be noted that the notion of pairing as an associatively
constitutive component of my experience of theother does seem to
solve the problem of solipsism. We might, along with Steeves, call
this the "fringe benefit" of pairing.6 To return to the questions posed
in our introduction, then, we can affirm that the notions of appresen-
tation and pairing do seem (a) to provide an account of intersubjectiv-
ity which is consistent with Husserl's transcendental idealism.
Moreover, this account of intersubjectivity does (b) appear to dispel
the spectre ofsolipsism. We have moved beyond (to employ Buber's
locution) the vibration of the I in its lonely truth.
However, the satisfaction of (a) leaves us with problems with
respect to (c), (the question whether Husserl provides a notion of the
other which actually challenges the primacy of the ego). For Husserl's
focus, pace transcendental idealism, is still on the apperception of the
other by the ego. Pairing, while an associative passive synthesis,
nonetheless "first comes about when the Other enters my field of
perception" (Husserl, CM, 113; emphasis added). The question for
Husserl, then, is: how is the apperception of the other in pairing pos-
sible? Our concern, however, is to recognize the way in which
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Husserl's examination of this question points towards a negative
response to our own question (c).
II. THE PRIMACY OF THE EGO
We have said that the fifth Meditation represents something of a
11dialectical coup" for Husserl. That is, the examination of intersub-
jectivity-as a means to the solution of the problem of solipsism-
reveals that subjectivity, while it may appear to be a solus ipse, is in
fact always already an intersubjectivity. My ego is constituted simul-
taneously with the other's ego in the associatively constitutive oper-
ation of pairing. The ego is always given with its other-directed
intentionalities;' when the ego emerges, the alter-ego emerges and
vice-versa. Construed in this fashion, the problem of solipsism be-
comes a pseudo-problem, one that dissolves as soon as the structure
of (inter)subjectivity is made clear.
However, the inter-related notions of appresentation, analogical
apperception and pairing still leave us with difficulties from the
standpoint of (c) above. Claims to reciprocity aside, pairing is a
mechanism which nonetheless operates in the ego's sphere of own-
ness. Pairing arises, as Husserl teIls us, when the other enters my
perceptual field. Ultimately, Husserl is not prepared-given his com-
mitment to a thorough-going transcendental idealism-to relinquish
the priority of the ego. Despite the role of the alter-ego in pairing, the
other remains a 11 'modification' of myself" (Husserl, CM, 115). In-
deed, Husserl maintains that the only way to explain the possibility
of pairing-and of apperception-is to conceive of the other as an in-
tentional modification of my sphere of ownness. Analogical apper-
. ception may not be an inference in the traditional sense, but the fact
remains that the other ego is "conceivable only as an analqgue of
something included in my peculiar ownness" (Husserl, CM, 115).
Primacy must be accorded to my ego if the possibility of appercep-
tion is to be accounted for.
'Far from being a genuinely other, independent ego existing in its
own primordial sphere-a sphere of radical alterity-the other is
reduced to an analogue of my ego; it exists as "another version of me"
(Steeves, 87).7 This may not render Husserl's account inconsistent-
indeed, as he sees it, this move is required in order to preserve the
consistency of his phenomenological elucidation of the ego-and
while it does not plunge transcendental phenomenologyback into the _
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problem of solipsism (other egos do exist, but only insofar as my in-
tentional sphere is modified), it does deny pairing's claim to genuine
reciprocity. More problematically, it calls into question the authentic-
ity of constitutive intersubjectivity; if the other is a mere analogue of
my subjectivity, it is difficult to see how subjectivity, my stream of
subjective intentional processes, is not primary. For this reason, as
Anthony Steirlbock points out, "intersubjectivity is one of Husserl's
major blindspots" (Steinbock, 66).8
Again, while the ethical demand for radical heterogeneity at the
heart of intersubjectivity may be somewhat extrinsic to Husserl's
thought, it is not extrinsic in the sense that Husserl does seek an
account according to which genuine intersubjectivity is at work at the
constitutive level. Constitutive intersubjectivity is a requirement of
the social ontology, the notion of community, Husserl wants to
establish. The primacy of the ego precludes exactly this sort of social
ontology. Everything proceedsfrom my sphere of ownness. The other
has the mode "there" and I have the mode "here." Yet the mode
"there" is conceived purely in relation to "here." I apperceive the
other as having a mode of appearance of the sort I should have "if I
should go over there and be where he is" (Husserl, CM, 117). The
other ego is not a positive constitutive element of intersubjectivity;
rather, it is constituted via abstraction from my own subjectivity. In
other words, the other stays over "there" and we still have a homoge-
neous sphere of ownness impervious to the movement of a heteroge-
neous other. Contrary to Husserl's earlier assertions that ego and
alter ego exist in astate of mutual dependence, the ego now clearly
"retains its independent existence as founding or grounding" (Stein-
bock, 68).
Husserl's failure to clear space for the radically heterogeneous other
is reflected in the work of later thinkers who, while profoundly
influenced by Husserl's phenomenological excursions-which first
suggest the need for and the possibility of a non-foundational analy-
sis of the social world-nevertheless find it necessary to critique his
treatment of intersubjectivity. Two such thinkers are Emmanuel
Levinas and Gilles Deleuze. Each, in his own way (Levinas explicitly
and Deleuze, as always, more obliquely), fastens upon the ethical im-
plications of assigning primacy to the ego and its sphere of ownness.
Deleuze is concerned with the presuppositions of the very image
of thoughtthat posits a metaphysical, Cartesian ego. For Deleuze, the
ethical moment can emerge only in the confrontation between two
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non-egoic sets of intensities on a field of immanence-a confrontation
in which neither player can claim primacy or priority. In the confron-
tation itself-in the event of that meeting-the ethical moment
emerges; the focus is on the event and not on the subjects involved.
Indeed, the challenge of Deleuzian ethics is to conceive of the ethical
moment without invoking the notions of "ego" or "subject." De-
leuze's work, and Difference and Repetition in particular, contains a
vivisection of the metaphysical ego. At best, we can speak of "passive
selves" operating in problematic fields in relations to questions. But
these "selv~s are larval subjects" (Deleuze, DR, 78), collections of
"furtive contemplations" drawing difference from repetition. The
"dissolved self" is not a static metaphysical ego that could undergo
modifications;9 rather, it is nothing other than modification, a perpet-
ual play of difference. The larval subject thus "does not fit the catego-
ries of the land the Self" (Deleuze, DR, 258). Clearly, then, the appeal
to a Cartesian framework in which an independent ego-or the sub-
jective processes of that ego-constitutes the world and other egos is
the mistake par excellence. 1o
In the first chapter of Difference and Repetition, for example,
Deleuze criticizes the "Thomistic echoes in Husserl" (Deleuze, DR,
66). Just as Aquinas arrives at an account of being through the appre-
hension of sensible quiddities, assigning being to the divine via ab-
straction from the sensible phantasm, so Husserl constitutes the ob-
jective world-and other egos-via a sort of abstraction (dubbed
"analogizing apperception") from the phenomena immediately acces-
sible to the conscious ego. Aquinas proceeds via sensible quiddities;
Husserl proceeds via the ego's stream ofsubjective intentional proc-
esses. l1 The point with respect to Husserl is that this phenomenologi-
cal approach leads him to posit a constituting Cartesian ego-a
subjectivity which accounts for all other subjectivities and for the
objective world itself. The mistake of according primacy to the ego, a
mistake characteristic of the representational model of thought gen-
erally, is thus the mistake of "ensuring the convergence of all points
of view on the same object or the same world, or [of] making all mo-
ments properties ofthe same Self" (Deleuze, DR, 56). Deleuze's remarks
thus contain a metaphysically driven criticism as weIl as an ethical
criticism. He takes aim at a certain conception of the ego, one predi-
cated upon a received ontological framework, or "dogmatic image of
thought." The critique is less explicitly ethical than one of the sort
mounted by Levinas. The constituting, metaphysical ego closed-ur in
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itself cannot partake in the ethical confrontation on the plane of
immanence; it can only subsurne all otherness into its autonomous
sameness. With this image, the other is reduced to the status of either
an object or a subject. However, as Deleuze points out, "it is not even
clear that thought ... may be related to a substantial, completed and
well-constituted subject" (Deleuze, DR, 118). Quite the contrary:
thought is a "terrible," Dionysianmovement "whichcanbe sustained
only under the conditions of a larval subject" (Deleuze, DR, 118). But
Deleuze's analyses, driven as they are by the desire to unveil the
Dionysian world shrouded by this dogmatic image of thought, are
not without an ethical motive. While the dogmatic image of thought
represents a profound betrayal of what it means to think, it also
represents a profound betrayal of the larval subject's relationship
with the other in the heterogeneous ethical moment. For "there is no
love which does not begin with the revelation of a possible world as
such, enwound in the other which expresses it" (Deleuze, DR, 261)..
Perhaps at no other juncture do the concerns of Deleuze and Levinas
so poignantly converge.
Still, there are relevant contrasts and they come into even sharper
focus when we consider the work of Levinas. For Levinas, the ethical
moment arises only when the ego is confronted by the absolute other
that ruptures its apparent autonomy. The ego is utterly passive in the
face of the other, for the other cannot be assimilated by the subsum-
ing ego; the ego is torn asunder, accused by the other. While Levinas
is profollndly influenced by Husserl's theory of internaI time con-
sciousness,12 he is nonetheless highly critical of "the position of the
subject in the philosophy issued by Husserl" (Levinas, OTB, 96). The
Husserlian ego gathers all divergencies met with in experience into a
schema of the present-the present of intentional consciousness. "In
Husserl, the time structure of sensibility is a time of what can be
recuperated by the ego" (Levinas, OTB, 34). The upshot is that the
Husserlian ego gathers all encountered otherness into the synchrony
of its structure. The otherness of the other ego is "the originality of
something included in my particular ownness" (Husserl, CM, 123).
Levinas's entire objective, however, is to reveal the diachrony at the
heart of the ethical moment. The ego does not subsurne the other in'to
its autonomous being, for the other confronts the ego from a sphere of
pure-alterity which is refractory to all categories of a totalizing sub-
jectivity. The other cannot be reduced to a moment of the same, of
"Being," for it signifies pure difference-it emerges from an "other-
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wise than Being." The ego does not constitute the other ego through
a "passive synthesis"; on the contrary, the ego is vulnerable to the
other and its vulnerability is a "wounding, a passivity more passive
than all passivity" (Levinas, OTB, 15).13
What is really at issue for Levinas is Husserl's characterization of
the subject's intentional synchronizing activity. Husserlian internal
time consciousness precludes genuine otherness because it focuses on
what can be recuperated by the intentional ego; it emphasizes the
continuity of the temporal flow of intentional processes. "Subjectiv-
ity" for Husserl signifies collusionwith essence, whereas, for Levinas,
"subjectivity" signifies precisely "the possibility of a break out of es-
sence" (Levinas, OTB, 8). For Husserl, "time is ... a recuperation of all
divergencies, through retention, memory and history" (Levinas, OTB,
9). "Time" is the time of what returns, of what can be assimilated by
the ego's intentional temporal flow. Subjectivity for Levinas, how-
ever, indicates a diachronous time, a lapse, or pre-ontological gap, in
this synchronizing flow: "a lapse of time that does not return, a
diachrony refractory to all synchronization, a transcending diach-
rony" (Levinas, OTB, 9).
This "lapse" is signalied then by the ego's preoriginary, pre-onto-
logical responsibility for the other-precisely the responsibility
effaced by the Husserlian account. My responsibility for the other
indicates a diachronous time, "a time that does not enter into the
unity of transcendental apperception" (Levinas, OTB, 140). It is not
that-as for Husserl-the ego is constituted simultaneously with the
other. It is, rather, that the ego is constituted by being accused by the
other. The sameness or reciprocity required by analogical appresenta-
tion-"pairing"-is precluded by the ego's obsession with the other
as radical alterity, the purely heterogeneous, in proximity. Proximity
is a non-reciprocal relation. Obsession, or the "one-for-the-other" is
non-reciprocity; it "is not the one trans-substantified into another"
(Levinas, OTB, 141). The responsibility for the other makes of the I a
"me": an accused subjectivity constituted on the basis of this accusa-
tion. The accused me "escapes the concept of an ego in ipseity"
(Levinas, OTB, 84). The encounter with the other is not a moment of
knowing where the ego can apperceive the other via an analogizing
transfer. Such a transfer takes place in what Levinas dubs the "Said."
Rather, the encounter with the other is a moment of obsession, a
moment of the "Saying"-prior to all ontological significations-in
which the other comes at me as if from on high. Most importantly,
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"the knot of subjectivity consists in going to the other without con-
cerning oneself with his movement toward me" (Levinas, OTB, 84).
There can be no apperception of the other by the ego; there is only my
responsibility for the other. Subjectivity is thus constituted, not in a
synchronie moment of apperception but in a diachronous moment of
accusation. Subjectivity is martyrdom and persecution (cf. Levinas,
OTB, 146).
The contrasts are thus quite clear: where Levinas seeks to reveal
heterogeneity, Husserl seeks to establish the autonomy of the ego;
where Levinas emphasizes the diachrony of the ethical confrontation,
Husserl stresses the synchronizing operations of a self-contained ego.
Indeed, Levinas's entire ethical enterprise is set in stark opposition to
Husserl's fundamental phenomenological commitment, vize "that
everything existing for me must derive its existential sense exclu-
sively from me myself" (Husserl, CM, 150). Levinas demands the
absolute, irreducible other, whereas Husserl allows for only the logi-
cal other. As Steinbock notes, with the notion of "pairing," "[HusserI]
only really wins back the logical 'other,' a 'second I'" (Steinbock,
68).14 This "second I," or "other by analogy," is clearly not the abso-
lute other required by Levinasian ethics,15 nor is it the non-egoic,
reduced subjectivity sought after by someone like Deleuze. The ego's
commerce with the other may, for Husserl, result in the constitution
of the social world, but-to invoke another phrase from Martin
Buber-the seed remains in the ego.
Before closing, a note on the motivations underlying Levinas's
and Deleuze's respective critiques is in order. Levinas is concerned
with the ethical moment, with my confrontation with the other,
which is prior to all significations in the Said. It is a preoriginary, pre-
ontological moment. Levinas's thought thus contains a critique of
ontology, insofar as it effaces this preontological, ethical moment.
That is, Levinas contests ontology's claim to being first philosophy.16
In contrast, Deleuze's critique is not so much ethically motivated as
it is motivated by adesire to unmask dogmatism in thought gener-
ally. Deleuze objects not to ontology as first philosophy per se.
Indeed, we might say that Deleuze does a fair bit of"ontologizing"-
perverse, irreverent, anarchieal ontologizing, but ontologizing all the
same. What Deleuze objects to is dogmatic ontology-any image of
thought which denies and seeks to suffocate the active, creative forces
of difference which animate thought and render it truly productive
and affirmative. Levinas's and Deleuze's respective critiques con-
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verge on the rejection of the traditional metaphysical subject, but they
get there by different routes and for different reasons. Levinas rejects
ontology as first philosophy because it is the ethical face-to-face
encounter which is in fact foundational; Deleuze rejects dogmatic,
representational ontologies which sublimate the active, productive
elements of thought.
We can conclude, then, by re-addressing the three questions
posed at the outset of our discussion. The fifth Meditation's account
of intersubjectivity is (a) consistent with HusserI's earlier explication
of transcendental idealism and does seem (b) to dispel the spectre of
solipsism. However, (a) and (b) render it impossible for Husserl to (c)
provide a suitably robust notion of the Other (one which challenges
the primacy of the ego and which can thereby underpin an account of
the genuine face-to-face ethical relationship).
NOTES
1 For more on the crucial phenomenological notion of epoche, see
Natanson, pp. 56-61 (see the bibliography at the end of this paper).
2 As pointed out above, it does not take Husserl until the fifth Medita-
tion to acknowledge this problem. In the second Meditation, for example,
he tells us thatepoche, conceived as "pure egology," "apparently condemns
us to a solipsism" (CM, 30). He opts, however, to leave the consideration of
this difficulty until the final Meditation. For more on Husserl's recognition
of the problem of solipsism, see Kersten, pp. 258-59.
3 In this way, the fifth Meditation really becomes an elucidation of-to
use J. N. Mohanty's phrase-"the complete structure of the transcendental
theory of experience of the other" (Mohanty, 72).
4 For more on the non-inferential nature of this "transfer," see Steeves,
p.85.
5 This is what Mohanty has in mind when he tells us that Husserl is
"aware of the idea of empathy as constitutive of the other ego" (Mohanty,
71).
6 Steeves, p. 89. See also Steeves's excellent extended discussion of the
mechanism of pairing, pp. 86-90.
7 Natanson also recognizes the analogous nature of the other ego in this
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context. Transcendental"intersubjectivity" does establish the identity of the
other ego, but it is merely an "analogous identity" founded on a sameness
which is "the prime achievement of intentionality" (Natanson, 101).
8 Steinbock, however, goes on to argue that this negative assessment of
Husserlian intersubjectivity can be maintained only if we restrict ourselves
to the Cartesian Meditations, in which Husserl"puts forward a Cartesian Idea
of philosophy" (Steinbock, 67). The later Husserl, by contrast, "breaks with
the egological account espoused in the fifth Cartesian Meditation" (Stein-
bock, 72). Our concern at present, however, is with the Husserl of the Medi-
tations; an examination of the later works is beyond our purview. All the
same, even Steinbock concedes that in the later Husserl, the ego is still
accorded a certain privilege (cf. Steinbock, 75-76). The framework of the
Cartesian Meditations is eschewed-and a more vital intersubjectivity is
sought after-yet Husserl maintains the primacy of the homeworld of the
ego. It does not seem, then, that this is approach is any more promising in
the context of the present discussion (for more on Husserl's later phenome-
nology, see Steinbock, 70-77 and Mohanty, 72).
9 For more on the Deleuzian notion of a "dissolved self," see Difference
and Repetition, pp. 276-77.
10 My objective here is not to present a full account and defense of
Deleuze's "ethics of the event." The point, rather, is to recognize that Hus-
serl's account of intersubjectivity, with primacy assigned to the ego, cannot
satisfy the demand for genuine heterogeneity.
11 Again, cf. CM, p. 127.
12 Husserl's theory of temporality is particularly important with respect
to one of the guiding questions of Levinas's enterprise, viz. "does tempo-
rality go beyond essence?" (Otherwise Than Being, 31). Levinas recognizes
much of value in Husserl's theory, specifically his account of the "lived and
the sensed" and his "polemics against psychologism" (Otherwise Than Being,
32). It would certainly be amistake to single-out Husserl as the object of
Levinas's unmitigated criticism. There are no whipping boys for Levinas.
Nevertheless, subjectivity remains an intentionality for Husserl, and to this
core Husserlian tenet Levinas is compelled to object. It is for this reason that
the contrast with Husserl stands as one of the most fruitful avenues of
approach to the Levinasian subject.
13 On this point, Levinas does not shy away from what might sound
like hyperbole. While the subjectivity of the subject for Husserl is consti-
tutive of the other ego, for Levinas "the subjectivity of the subject is perse-
cution and martyrdom" (146). Far from constituting the other ego as an
analogue of itself, "the ego [is] stripped of its scornful and imperialistic sub-
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jectivity" (146). Faced with theirreducibleother, theegohasnorecourse but
to say me voici, "here I am."
14 Steeves also recognizes that the Husserlian ego never really confronts
the irreducible other. Husserl, he points out, "makes room for Others in a
sort of 'logical space' " (Steeves, 87), but this space is still subject to appro-
priation by the ego (Cf. also Kersten, 256).
15 Adriaan Peperzak, one of the foremost commentators on Levinas, is
also extremely helpful on this point. While praising Husserl for recognizing
that consciousness is constituted by affective and practical intentions-in
addition to objectifying, presenting and representing intentions-he points
out that Husserl still strives towards "the absolute self-possession of a tran-
scendental ego including the truth of all givens in the knowledge of Itself"
(Peperzak, p. 15; cf. also pp. 14-19, passim).
16 Again, it is the hubris or presumptuousness of ontology that Levinas
attacks. As he points out, his way of thinking "does not fail to recognize be-
ing or treat it, ridiculously and pretentiously, with disdain" (Levinas, OTB,
16). The point, rather, is that being-and ontology-takes on its just mean-
ing only on the basis of proximity and the primordial ethical relationship.
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